The four-year-old Ladakh conflict between China and India that started this spring has affected the relationship more than anticipated. The battle between China and India now extends beyond the continental boundary to include a sizable naval component, which is one of the noteworthy developments in its aftermath. Concerns regarding China’s increasing economic and naval power in the Indian Ocean region and its potential impact on India’s national security are now openly voiced by Indian leaders. The marine domain is linked to the peace, security, and prosperity of the area, according to New Delhi. As a result, it has adopted a multifaceted strategy to safeguard its maritime backyard, working to increase its naval presence in the area and build a network of relationships in order to thwart any hostile interference or disturbance. Due to the two nations’ divergent attempts to increase their own spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), this competition has already had a cascading effect on the region. However, further unrest in the region is probably in store because of China’s and India’s and the IOR countries’ divergent worldviews.
Indian Ocean Region in China’s Calculus
China should actively pursue commercial relations with this highly prospective demographically dynamic region on the basis of economic need. To obtain the resources and market access that are essential to China’s development, the governments of the surrounding countries must provide their political support. In order to do this, the Chinese leadership needs to build its geopolitical and geoeconomic dominance beyond the South China Sea. One important vehicle for this is the Belt and Road Initiative. The maritime road has emerged as the mainstay of the trade component since the land belt component is threatened by security concerns or disputed borders throughout Asia because the waters are open and unrestricted. While a military presence is required to safeguard trade routes from pirates and other maritime threats, officials and academics are dubious of Beijing’s strategy of utilising dual-purpose assets—such as research vessels and submarines—possibly for spying. Furthermore, China filled the power vacuum that resulted from the pandemic’s forced introspection and attention to home concerns, which was directed towards the commons.
Concerns regarding China’s increasing economic and naval power in the Indian Ocean region and its potential impact on India’s national security are now openly voiced by Indian leaders.
China has influenced the area in a number of ways. In terms of strategy, it has increased its emphasis on creating infrastructure, such as underwater jetties in Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Maldives, and maintaining a dual-use port presence. However, some Indian analysts believe this is all part of China’s plan to encircle India. China has surpassed the US in terms of military might, with a fleet of over 370 ships. Furthermore, it has strengthened ties with Pakistan, India’s regional foe, by giving it eight state-of-the-art Hangor-class submarines with air-independent propulsion, therefore escalating the regional arms race beneath the sea. Not coincidentally, the submarines have the name of PNS Hangor, the diesel-attack submarine from Pakistan that, during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, sunk the Indian frigate Khukri and its captain, MN Malla. These events have sparked a discussion on the rationale and ramifications of Chinese actions in the IOR both within the Indian strategic community and more widely.
Fishing Fleets and Research Vessels as Strategic Assets
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased its patrolling in the IOR and attempted to employ research vessels and fishing fleets for potentially strategic objectives including gathering intelligence. The PLAN and a sizable Chinese fishing boat were seen by the Indian Navy in January 2020 in the Western Indian Ocean, outside of India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). That year, there were a few more reports of similar encounters. In addition to raising concerns about the possibility of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Indian Ocean region, these incidents also raise the possibility of a national security risk because the boats are either using AIS spoofing or turning off their AIS in order to prevent locational tracking close to the EEZ.
The growing number of Chinese satellite tracking and hydrographic survey research vessels in the IOR, which might be utilised as the PLA’s “eyes and ears,” is another reason for concern. These boats can be used for geological research, bathymetric data collecting, seabed sampling, underwater current profiling, buoy placement and maintenance, and other tasks, according to a number of studies and official Indian sources. Nonetheless, specialists surmise that these boats are outfitted with sonars to capture underwater information necessary to monitor submarine motion and would perhaps be able to acquire missile-related information for military objectives.
India’s Maritime Vision and Response to Threats
India’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean is an outgrowth of its foreign policy in the area, which is based on the understanding that the IOR’s security and development are interdependent. Thus, the Indian Navy has adopted a three-pronged approach to counter China’s threats and demonstrate its commitment to defending its interests in the maritime domain: increasing its presence in the region, strengthening extra-regional partnerships to benefit the IOR, and building regional capacity through its indigenous defence programme.
The Indian Navy has been conducting mission-based deployments in the Indian Ocean since 2018, guaranteeing the constant presence of its vessels near eight significant ocean entry points. India has proven its willingness and ability to be the first responder in the region, whether it is by assisting with rescue and relief efforts during local tragedies or by foiling attempts by pirates to resurface in the Western Indian Ocean. India has expanded its operational reach and is now projecting strength farther into the Indian Ocean Rim thanks to its new facilities, which include INS Jatayu in the Lakshadweep islands, INS Kadamba close to Karwar in the Western Indian Ocean, and INS Agalega island in Mauritius.
Furthermore, in an effort to strengthen defence ties with neighbouring nations, India has started stationing defence attachés for the first time in a number of Asian and African countries, including Tanzania, Djibouti, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Djibouti in early 2024.
Simultaneously, New Delhi has come to the realisation that maritime risks are international and need for coordinated action. As a result, navy ship deployments and port calls to friendly neighbouring nations—which include South America on the west and Fiji on the east—have been regular occurrences in recent years. The extent and regularity of coordinated patrols and passage exercises, as well as the multilateral framework of naval exercises like those held in MILAN, MALABAR, and ASEAN India, have only increased in recent years. Furthermore, in order to preserve international law and a rules-based system, the United States, France, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other allies have been working with India to raise marine domain awareness and information-sharing in the Indo-Pacific area. With the goal of “providing near-real-time, integrated and cost effective maritime data” to like-minded regional partners, the Quad Indo Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) Initiative and the Gurugram-based Information Fusion Centre- Indian Ocean Region are expanding their international engagements.
Providing defence supplies and equipment to help nations in the region resist China is a relatively new aspect of India’s engagement with the region. Since 2020, India has given regional countries like the Maldives, Seychelles, Vietnam, and Myanmar platforms for capacity-building. The Philippines’ 2022 acquisition of India’s homegrown Brahmos supersonic cruise missile and the interest from other nations, including Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, show that the nation’s defence production programme, known as “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India), is on the right track. Strategically, New Delhi has backed Philippine sovereignty in the South China Sea, and the two nations’ defence and economic alliance is expanding. Furthermore, in an effort to strengthen defence ties with neighbouring nations, India has started stationing defence attachés for the first time in a number of Asian and African countries, including Tanzania, Djibouti, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Djibouti in early 2024.
Contestation in the Future
With China striving to be the dominant force in the region and rejecting the idea of a multipolar Asia, Sino-Indian tensions have expanded beyond a purely territorial issue and are now part of a much bigger regional issue. As a result, and possibly unstable, the Indian Ocean Region’s maritime domain has evolved into another arena of rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi. One reason is that China’s augmented naval presence and deployments in the Indian Ocean offer more chances for India and China to engage in maritime combat. Secondly, in contrast to China, India’s vision for the Indian Ocean aligns with that of the majority of the surrounding nations: the establishment of a rules-based maritime order that permits unrestricted navigation, safe trade routes, open access to all, and the settlement of conflicts amicably between parties. It is believed that India’s strong participation in a number of dialogue initiatives, including the Quad, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association, will help to resolve regional conflicts through multilateralism and conversation. But in the South China Sea, China has recently repeatedly shown a disrespect for international law—a behaviour that could extend into the Indian Ocean. As a result, New Delhi and other cities in the area would be wise to get ready for a more dangerous maritime environment in the future.